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Despite all the attention it receives from both its supporters and crit-
ics, universal jurisdiction remains one of the more confused doctrines of
international law. Indeed, while commentary has focused largely and
unevenly on policy and normative arguments either favoring or under-
cutting the desirability of its exercise, a straightforward legal analysis
breaking down critical aspects of this extraordinary form of jurisdiction
remains conspicuously missing. Yet universal jurisdiction's increased
practice by states calls out for such a clear descriptive understanding.
The following Essay will engage this under-treated area. It will offer to
explicate a basic, but overlooked, feature of the law of universal juris-
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diction: If national courts prosecute on grounds of universal jurisdiction,
they must use the international legal definitions-contained in custom-
ary international law-of the universal crimes they adjudicate; other-
wise, their exercise of universal jurisdiction contradicts the very interna-
tional law upon which it purports to rely. The Essay will argue that this
legal feature derives from the distinctively symbiotic nature of universal
prescriptive jurisdiction (the power to apply law to certain persons or
things) and universal adjudicative jurisdiction (the power to subject cer-
tain persons or things to judicial process). Unlike other bases of jurisdic-
tion in international law, the prescriptive substance of universal jurisdic-
tion authorizes and circumscribes universal adjudicative jurisdiction; in
other words, it defines not only the universal crimes themselves, but also
the judicial competence for all courts wishing to exercise universal ju-
risdiction.
The Essay will look to chart out some important implications of this
thesis for the real-world practice of universal jurisdiction: It will evalu-
ate how most easily to determine the customary definitions of universal
crimes, to detect breaches of international law by courts that manipulate
subjectively those definitions, and to enforce against such illicit manipu-
lation. The Essay will contend that while some definitional aspects in-
variably remain to be ironed out by state practice, the provisions of
widely-ratified and longstanding international treaties provide generally
the best record of the core customary definitions of universal crimes, and
accordingly, supply not only a harmonized point of departure for courts
wishing properly to exercise universal jurisdiction, but also a useful
means for detecting breaches of international law by overzealous courts
seeking only to exploit universal jurisdiction for purely political or sen-
sationalist ends. The framework presented thus will address concerns
that universal jurisdiction hazards unbridled abuse. As the Essay will ar-
gue, the law of universal jurisdiction does not; rather, it prescribes legal
limits. And the Essay will conclude that in the end, these limits are en-
forced not by those states exercising universal jurisdiction, but instead
by other jurisdictionally-interested states-that is, most often by those
states whose national citizens are the subject of foreign universal juris-
diction proceedings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike other bases of jurisdiction in international law, universal juris-
diction requires no territorial or national nexus to the alleged act or ac-
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tors over which a state legitimately may claim legal authority.' Univer-
sal jurisdiction instead is based entirely on the commission of certain
"universal crimes."2 At the present stage of development of international
law, this category of crime is generally considered to include piracy,
slavery, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and
"perhaps certain acts of terrorism."' 3 It is no secret that the near future
may envisage an increased rubric of universal crime that includes, inter
alia, human sex trafficking, nuclear arms smuggling, and perhaps other
characteristically transnational offenses. A "universal jurisdiction" at-
taches to these crimes, so the argument goes,4 because they are univer-
sally condemned and all states have a shared interest in proscribing such
crimes and prosecuting their perpetrators.5 Accordingly, every state has
what is called prescriptive jurisdiction, or lawmaking authority, 6 to pro-
scribe universal crimes wherever they occur and whomever they in-
volve, and adjudicative jurisdiction to subject the alleged universal
criminal to its judicial process.7 Thus, if a State A national commits a
universal crime against another State A national in State A, all states
have jurisdiction to prosecute.
Universal jurisdiction has been the focus of much policy and norma-
tive debate: It has been hailed as a catalyst in the global struggle to bring
to justice elusive international criminals like tyrants and terrorists, while
on the other hand decried as a dangerously pliable tool for hostile states
to damage international relations by initiating unfounded proceedings
against each other's officials and citizens. 8 Such expansive jurisdiction
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987).
2. See id. § 404 cmt. a.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987)); see
also THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29 (Stephen Macedo ed., Prince-
ton Univ. 2001) [hereinafter THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES]; Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Uni-
versal Jurisdiction: In Absentia Signaling over Clearly Defined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 537,
578-602 (2005).
4. This Essay will not address directly the underlying rationale for universal jurisdiction or its
extension to certain crimes, but will accept for present purposes its legal existence as well as the
generally acknowledged list of crimes. The focus of the Essay instead will be on clearly marking
out some important legal parameters that govern how courts must exercise such jurisdiction under
international law.
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 cmt. a
(1987).
6. Id. § 401 (a).
7. Id. § 401 (b).
8. For a good primer on the debate, compare Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Ju-
risdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 86 (2001), with Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction,
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has in fact provoked sharp backlash from many circles-including for-
mer and current U.S. administrations. 8 Yet in the face of some blows to
its use,9 universal jurisdiction is, for the foreseeable future, here to stay.
A number of states' courts have in the past year alone exercised this type
of extraordinary jurisdiction,'0 and the recent proliferation of domestic
legislation providing for universal jurisdiction" signals that the trend
will only continue.
But despite the heated political controversy that surrounds it, and its
increased use by states, a straightforward legal analysis interrogating
some basic features of universal jurisdiction remains strangely lacking.
This Essay will engage this under-treated area; it will not ask whether
and under what circumstances universal jurisdiction might be a good
idea, but rather will seek to discern the international law governing how
courts must exercise universal jurisdiction when in fact they pursue such
exercises, as well as the international legal consequences of improper
exercises of universal jurisdiction. My argument therefore will be pri-
80 FOREIGN AFF. 150 (2001). For a progressive, normative restatement of how universal jurisdic-
tion ought to be exercised so as to facilitate its purposes, see THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra
note 3.
8. Due to pressure from other nations-principally the United States-Belgium restricted the
application of its controversially expansive universal jurisdiction law to require, inter alia, more
traditional links with Belgium, immunity for foreign governmental officials, and an increased role
for the public prosecutor. See Steven R. Ratner, Editorial Comment, Belgium's War Crimes Stat-
ute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888, 891 (2003).
9. See Ratner, supra note 9; Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by Its Global
Reach, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2003 at AO1.
10. Spain convicted Argentine naval officer Adolfo Scilingo for "crimes against humanity"
based on his participation in a program of throwing political prisoners from airplanes during Ar-
gentina's "dirty war." Reuters, Argentine Ex-Officer Convicted in Spain; 'Dirty War' Trial First
of Its Kind, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2005, at A17; Giles Tremlett, 'I Don't Try To Justify Myself,
GUARDIAN, Apr. 21, 2005, at 6. Spain has also issued warrants for three United States soldiers
concerning an incident in which a U.S. tank fired on a Baghdad hotel, killing two journalists.
Drew Brown, Spanish Judge Wants 3 Soldiers Arrested in Journalists' Deaths, SEATTLE TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2005, at A16. One of the journalists killed was not a Spanish national; therefore any
charges brought based on his death would rely upon the ground of universal jurisdiction. In Brit-
ain, London's Central Criminal Court recently convicted Afghan warlord Farayadi Sawar Zardad
of torture and hostage taking in Afghanistan between 1991 and 1996. Nikki Tait, UK Court Con-
victs Afghan Warlord, FIN. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at 12. Similarly, Dutch courts have brought
charges against two former Afghan generals for war crimes and torture committed during the So-
viet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Marlise Simons, 2 Afghans Face Dutch War-Crimes
Charges From 80's Soviet Era, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A13. Belgium has even resusci-
tated its "universal jurisdiction law" to grandfather in a case against former Chadian dictator
Hissene Habre. Marlise Simons, Belgium Indicts Chad's Ex-Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005,
at A8.
11. See infra notes 82-86 (listing legislation implementing the Statute of the International
Criminal Court and providing for universal jurisdiction).
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marily a legal one, albeit with important policy implications that will
contribute to the larger debate since it goes to the very heart of when and
how universal jurisdiction can be exercised under international law. The
argument will proceed as follows:
It is presently contrary to international law for one state to extend uni-
laterally its prescriptive jurisdiction into the territory of another state ab-
sent some territorial or national link to the matter over which the first
state claims competence-for example, where the act has an impact
within that state's territory, involves its nationals, or directly threatens
its security.' 2 Thus State B cannot, without such a link, project its do-
mestic laws onto State A and vice versa. Yet, as we have seen, the prin-
ciple of universal jurisdiction grants all states-including our hypotheti-
cal State B-jurisdiction to prosecute universal crimes irrespective of
where the crimes occur or which state's nationals are involved (either as
perpetrators or victims). This immediately raises the important-but
thus far neglected-legal question: What prescriptive jurisdiction pre-
scribes universal crimes? In concrete terms, what prescriptive law must
national courts apply when they exercise universal adjudicative jurisdic-
tion?
The answer, this Essay will submit, is international prescriptive juris-
diction, and thus in substance, international law. In other words, while a
state's national law may not extend unilaterally its prescriptive reach
into the territory of another state, international law can, and does, just
that with respect to the proscription on universal crime-only in cases of
universal jurisdiction, the adjudication of this international legal prohibi-
tion occurs through the operation of national courts. Because the interna-
tional prescriptive substance of universal crimes authorizes a given
court's universal jurisdiction, courts must apply that substance-that is,
the international legal definitions of the crimes-when they exercise
universal jurisdiction, or else their jurisdictional claim contradicts the
very international law upon which it purports to rely. The thesis from
which I will build my argument therefore is simply that the exercise of
universal adjudicative jurisdiction fundamentally depends upon the ap-
plication of the legal substance of universal prescriptive jurisdiction, and
that this prescriptive substance-the definitions of universal crimes-
derives from customary international law.
Part II will explain how this thesis brings to light and grounds itself in
the uniqueness of universal jurisdiction among the jurisdictional bases
12. See infra note 33, and accompanying text, listing bases ofjurisdiction.
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generally accepted in international law. For unlike other bases, universal
jurisdiction's prescriptive substance at the same time authorizes and cir-
cumscribes courts' adjudicative jurisdiction; it defines not only the uni-
versal crimes themselves, but also the judicial competence for all courts
wishing to exercise universal jurisdiction. And it is a prescriptive sub-
stance common to all states since it can arise only as a matter of custom-
ary law, universally binding on them all. My claim thus will place legal
limits on the exercise of universal jurisdiction. It is not just the empow-
erment of states by international law to adjudicate certain matters under
any prescriptive law they see fit. Instead, when national courts prosecute
on a theory of universal jurisdiction they must apply the international le-
gal definitions of the crimes they adjudicate, or else their jurisdiction
conflicts with international law. Part 1I also will employ this thesis to re-
but the claim that because courts typically need some form of domestic
authorization to exercise their jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction depends
not on international law but on national law.
The thesis raises a number of important questions for the practice of
universal jurisdiction that need answering, namely: How are courts to go
about determining the definitional substance of what might be dubbed
"fuzzy" customary international law? Further, how can states evaluate
whether a universal jurisdiction court departs from the customary defini-
tion of the crime, thus rendering its underlying jurisdiction contrary to
international law? And finally, how can interested states-that is, states
on whose territories the universal crimes occurred and/or whose nation-
als are the subject of universal jurisdiction proceedings-enforce against
illegitimate definitional expansions of universal crimes by overzealous
courts seeking only to exploit universal jurisdiction for political or sen-
sationalist ends?
In response to these questions, Parts III and IV will offer a basic
framework for evaluating the legality of universal jurisdiction exercises
under this Essay's thesis. In response to the first question-how to de-
termine the customary definitions of universal crimes-Part III will look
to the formation of customary law generally, and will maintain that as to
universal crimes in particular, their core substantive elements are set
forth quite explicitly in the various treaties and conventions prohibiting
the crimes under positive international law. I will not argue that treaty
law sets forth definitively the customary definitions of universal crimes,
but rather the best evidence of what those definitions are. While the con-
tention that treaties may generate customary law is perhaps not entirely
free from debate with respect to, for example, the formation of "instant
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custom" at the moment the treaty enters into force absent opportunity for
subsequent international acceptance of or acquiescence in the rules con-
tained therein, or the establishment of custom through only bilateral
treaties, I need not go so far for my argument. The treaties proscribing
the various universal crimes represent a relatively longstanding consen-
sus not only as to the prohibition on those crimes, but also-
necessarily-as to their substance. On this point, the Appendix to this
Essay will critically survey the positive law relating to each of the uni-
versal crimes listed above and assay some of the more important defini-
tional provisions which supply a harmonized prescriptive foundation for
courts wishing to exercise universal jurisdiction.' 3 My purpose in so do-
ing is not to elaborate comprehensively all aspects of the definitions of
universal crimes under customary law, but rather to provide courts and
international lawyers with a useful point of departure in line with the
analytical framework forwarded by this Essay. To be sure, although state
practice and opiniojuris (the two elements that make up customary law)
continue to fill in, refine and modify aspects of these customary defini-
tions, for present purposes courts have a clear and workable catalog of
core definitions handy, in the form of treaty provisions and legislation
transposing those provisions onto domestic law, with which to prosecute
universal crimes. In fact, national legislation enabling universal jurisdic-
tion characteristically draws from treaty law to define the relevant of-
fense 14 and courts consequently use that substantive definition to prose-
cute universal crimes, 15 thus reinforcing custom in this respect.
Next, because treaty provisions largely evidence the core definitions
of universal crimes, we might respond to the second question-how to
determine when universal jurisdiction courts deviate from the customary
definitions of the crimes-by saying initially that there are "easy cases"
and "hard cases." Where a court claiming universal jurisdiction clearly
departs from the subject crime's core definition-as evidenced by the
treaty-absent a showing that customary law has evolved to justify such
a departure, the illegitimacy of its jurisdictional claim is easily-
identifiable. Especially subject to easy-case categorization are universal
crimes with rule-based elements. A quick example here, and one that
13. See Appendix, infra. As the Appendix bears out, the treaties themselves tend to avow ei-
ther an explicit or implicit purpose to codify or create custom in their respective areas of interna-
tional lawmaking.
14. See infra notes 82-86.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 104-16.
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will be discussed in more detail below,' 6 is the Spanish Audiencia Na-
cional's illegitimate expansion of the victim classes in the definition of
genocide to include political groups, which purported to justify the
court's assertion of universal jurisdiction over former Chilean dictator
Augusto Pinochet. 17 Under this Essay's framework, had the case gone
forward on these grounds,' 8 Chile-both the territorial and national
state-would have had a powerful legal claim to reject Spanish jurisdic-
tion since the definition the court employed was plainly exorbitant. But
although treaties strongly evidence the core elements of universal
crimes, there invariably will be aspects of the definitions that need to be
ironed out further by state practice. Thus, objections to universal juris-
diction that are not based on a court's clear departure from the universal
crime's core substantive definition-as evidenced by the treaty-might
fall into the "hard case" category. Especially subject to hard-case classi-
fication are crimes that depend on the application of standards. Exam-
ples here might include whether a specific act constitutes a war crime
under standards of target selection and proportionality contained in the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols,' 9 or whether a par-
ticular interrogation technique constitutes torture under the Torture Con-
vention's widely-accepted definition of the crime. 20 The jurisprudence
of international criminal tribunals and of national courts exercising uni-
versal jurisdiction-decisions which are not precedent on their own but
21
nonetheless evidence state practice, would be particularly helpful
guides here. But in order to illustrate most simply its basic thesis, this
16. See infra text accompanying notes 104-16.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 104-06.
18. Torture ended up being the relevant crime of extradition for Great Britain, though Pino-
chet ultimately was not extradited but sent back to Chile because he was determined medically
unfit to stand trial. See Regina v. Bow St. Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte, [1999] No. 3, 2 W.L.R. 827, 833-36 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson), reprinted in
part in THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAIN 255,
268 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner, eds., 2000) (hereinafter THE PINOCHET PAPERS).
19. 1 have argued against the use of universal jurisdiction over war crimes generally for this
reason. See Appendix E, infra; Colangelo, supra note 3, at 587-94 (observing that these standards
afford courts too much latitude to allege war crimes against U.S. forces despite an unprecedented
adherence to international humanitarian law in the NATO bombing in the former Yugoslavia and
the 2003 invasion of Iraq).
20. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec.
10, 1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention]; see also infra Appendix F (for example, the phrase
"severe pain or suffering" is particularly open to interpretation).
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103 cmt. a,
b (1987).
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Essay admittedly concerns itself more with the easy cases-though the
hard cases undoubtedly supply fertile ground for further legal evaluation
of universal jurisdiction assertions in line with the framework forwarded
here. Indeed, and as Part IV indicates in its enforcement discussion,
where territorial and national states-states that have a strong legal in-
terest in a given universal jurisdiction assertion-object to the definition
of the crime that purports to justify another state's universal jurisdiction
claim, the resolution of that international legal clash will go far toward
determining further the customary definition of the crime at issue.
Finally, Part IV will deal with the question of enforcement against a
court's illegitimate definitional expansion of a universal crime upon
which the court purports to base its jurisdiction. Part IV will explain that
the international legal limits of universal jurisdiction are indeed enforce-
able against such courts, and that the enforcers are those states with con-
current jurisdiction over the alleged crimes-that is, states with territo-
rial or national jurisdiction. As I will show, where jurisdictionally
interested states reject an illegitimate universal jurisdiction claim stem-
ming from an improper manipulation of the underlying crime's defini-
tion, international law considers the universal jurisdiction claim an en-
during breach. In short, it is not the state exercising universal
jurisdiction, but most often those states whose nationals are in the dock,
that are the enforcers of the legal limits of universal jurisdiction.
II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION'S PRESCRIPTIVE-ADJUDICATIVE
SYMBIOSIS
Jurisdiction is the central concept in the interface between the nation
state and international law; as such, it describes the power allocation
both among individual states and between states and international law. A
state's jurisdiction, or what some may call "sovereignty," 22 refers by and
22. Although notoriously opaque, the label "sovereignty" invokes the familiar definition of
state power by implying the state's autonomous jurisdictional authority to create, implement, and
enforce its own laws; in short, it provides a metric by which changes in a given power dynamic-
for purposes of the present discussion, that between the state and international law-may be
measured. See Marcel Brus, Bridging the Gap between State Sovereignty and International Gov-
ernance: The Authority of Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 7-
10 (Gerard Kreijen, ed. Oxford 2004). See generally John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A
New Approach To An Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 786, 789-90 (2003). For a dis-
cussion of the evolution of the concept of sovereignty toward a human rights-based, popular sov-
ereignty see W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International
Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990).
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large to its authority to make, apply, and enforce law. More distinctly, a
state's prescriptive jurisdiction is its authority to apply its law to certain
persons or things,23 and its adjudicative jurisdiction is its authority to
subject persons or things to its judicial process.24 Importantly,
"[j]urisdiction to enforce or adjudicate is dependent on jurisdiction to
prescribe." 25 Thus a state has no inherent authority to subject persons or
things to its judicial process if that state has no lawmaking authority
over those persons or things to begin with.26
The international law of jurisdiction is a customary law. That is, it is
not based on treaties or other positive agreements among states, but
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a)
(1987).
24. Id. § 40 1(b).
25. CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 132 (2001);
RESTATEMENT § 431 cmt. a.
26. States may, however, agree either formally or informally to delegate among themselves ju-
risdiction absent territorial or national prescriptive authority-but such an exercise ofjurisdiction
is only legitimate insofar as it stems from the delegation ofjurisdiction by a state with territorial or
national prescriptive authority. For example, there is a form of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
exercised by some European states, in particular Germany, called the "vicarious administration of
justice" or "representation" principle which allows for the application of municipal criminal law
based only on the custody of a foreign defendant without other territorial or national links. This
type of jurisdiction is, however, preconditioned upon "a request from another state to take over
criminal proceedings, or either the refusal of an extradition request from another state and its will-
ingness to prosecute or confirmation from another state that it will not request extradition." Extra-
territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON CRIME
PROBLEMS 14 (1990). Unlike universal jurisdiction, the representation principle conforms with the
classical sovereignty model under which states have full prescriptive authority regarding conduct
within their territories. First, the principle requires some form of agreement or consent between
the custodialprosecuting state and the territorial state. See id.
([T]he 'representation' principle differs from the principle of universality in that the de-
cision to prosecute is not taken in isolation by the state claiming jurisdiction, but requires
a certain understanding, if not agreement, by the other state which is more directly con-
cemed, for instance the state where the offence has been committed.).
Hence, the territorial state permits the custodial state's application of prescriptive jurisdiction,
which of course the territorial state has a sovereign prerogative to delegate. Also in this connec-
tion, the principle is decidedly subordinate to other principles ofjurisdiction, which take priority.
See Jurgen Meyer, The Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction,
31 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 108, 116 (1990). Second, the substantive crime must be virtually indistin-
guishable as between the custodial and territorial states; the custodial state literally acts as a surro-
gate for the territorial state. See id. at 111
([T]he principle of the vicarious administration ofjustice... implies that it is insufficient
to find an applicable norm of the place of conduct which is identical to the [custodial
state's] norm; the particular conduct must also satisfy the elements of that norm. More-
over, the grounds of justification and excuse under the law of the place of conduct must
be observed....);
see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra at 14. In contrast, universal jurisdiction can be exercised ir-
respective of the permission and despite the prescriptive legislation of the territorial state.
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rather on state practice and opiniojuris, or the state's belief or intent that
it is acting with legal purpose 27 (though by these two components, as I
show in more detail below, treaties certainly may inform or evidence the
customary law of jurisdiction).2 8 While all states may contribute to in-
ternational custom since it embodies their collective "general practice
accepted as law,"29 custom is an external force on each individual state
that makes up part of the international law-making collective. 30 The le-
gal construct of jurisdiction essentially comprises the package of "exter-
nal rules that have defined [the nation] as a 'nation."' 31 Presently those
rules circumscribe the prescriptive reach of states based principally on
their authority over territory and national citizens. Traditional bases
therefore hold that a state has jurisdiction over acts that occur-even in
part-within its territory (subjective territoriality), may not occur but
have an effect within its territory (objective territoriality), involve its na-
tional citizens (active and passive personality-based on perpetrator and
victim respectively), and are directed against its security (protective
principle). Despite an observable allowance for concurrent jurisdiction
by multiple states, e.g., a matter occurs (or has an effect) in the territory
of one state but involves one or more nationals of another state, and even
conflicts between states with concurrent jurisdiction,33 the jurisdictional
27. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987) (describing this component as "a sense of legal obligation"); Statute of
the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153,
1179 (describing this component as "accepted as law").
28. See discussion infra note 46.
29. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 28, at art. 38.
30. In a recent defense of customary law, George Norman and Joel Trachtman explain this
phenomenon in the following manner: while custom is "endogenous to states as a group-
meaning that it is not a vertical structure produced outside or above the group of states-it has an
independent, exogenous influence on the behavior of each individual state." George Norman &
Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 542 (2005).
31. Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1110, 1113 (1982) [hereinafter D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights]; Anthony
D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"? 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1293, 1308 (1985)
(As a construct of international law, a nation is nothing more nor less than a bundle of
entitlements, of which the most important ones define and secure its boundaries on a
map, while others define its jurisdictional competency and the rights of its citizens when
they travel outside its borders.).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987);
see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limit: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts,
in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 168, 172 (Stephen Macedo, ed., 2004) (noting that like territorial
and national bases of jurisdiction, this protective principle is "defined in terms of [a state's] terri-
torial integrity or the safety of its citizens.").
33. See, e.g., Case of S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30-31 (Sept.
7) (ruling on the collision of a French ship with a Turkish ship, and observing that
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construct provides a relatively practicable and objective measure of the
authority of individual states vis a vis one another concerning a particu-
lar matter. Thus State B may apply its prescriptive jurisdiction to persons
and things within its territory, and therefore may apply its jurisdiction to
a State A national within State B borders. State B may even have a juris-
dictional claim over a State B national who happens to be in State A. But
absent some justifying territorial or national nexus (or agreement be-
tween the states), 34 State B may not project unilaterally its domestic laws
onto State A. For instance State B may not project unilaterally, say, its
traffic codes, onto State A. That issue is squarely within State A's sover-
eign jurisdiction. 35 It follows that State B's courts cannot apply State B's
traffic code to a State A driver, driving only in State A, and with no other
jurisdictional connection to State B since there exists no prescriptive ju-
risdiction upon which State B's adjudicative jurisdiction may rely. It
would be as if some British court applied the British rule that drivers
must drive on the left side of the road to a U.S. citizen, driving only in
the United States and with absolutely no connection to Britain. Such an
application plainly would clash with international law.
Yet universal jurisdiction allows State B's courts adjudicative author-
ity with respect to an act that occurs entirely within State A 's borders,
has no effect on the territory of State B, and involves only State A na-
tional citizens. If, as we have said, State B cannot extend its prescriptive
jurisdiction into the territory of State A, universal jurisdiction begs the
question of what prescriptive jurisdiction authorizes State B's courts. In
cases of universal jurisdiction that prescriptive jurisdiction is, as a legal
matter, international-for as we have seen already, extraterritorial pre-
scriptive jurisdiction of this sort cannot by law be national, e.g., State B
may not apply unilaterally its municipal law concerning traffic codes to
State A nationals acting with respect to other State A nationals in State A.
Universal crimes are instead proscribed at the level of international law
which, unlike national prescriptive jurisdiction, does extend into the ter-
ritory of all states.
[n]either the exclusive jurisdiction of either State, nor the limitations of the jurisdiction
of each to the occurrences which took place on the respective ships would appear calcu-
lated to satisfy the requirements of justice and effectively to protect the interests of the
two States. It is only natural that each should be able to exercise jurisdiction and to do so
in respect of the incident as a whole. It is therefore a case of concurrent jurisdiction.).
34. See supra note 27.
35. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which, even with a link to the conduct in
question, one state's prescriptive jurisdiction regarding traffic codes could justifiably extend into
the territory of another state.
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Universal jurisdiction is therefore quite unique among the bases of in-
ternational jurisdiction in two discrete but related respects. First, its pre-
scriptive and adjudicative faces are distinctively symbiotic: The pre-
scriptive substance of universal crimes not only defines the crimes
themselves, but also authorizes the adjudicative competence for all states
engendered by the commission of those crimes. In other words, univer-
sal adjudicative jurisdiction depends upon the definitional substance of
the crime as prescribed by universal prescriptive jurisdiction.
Second, the legal content of this prescriptive jurisdiction is moored in
customary international law. By contrast, a state's jurisdiction over its
territory or nationals-while certainly a matter of international law at the
edges since it describes the state's authority vis a vis other states-is not,
at the level of a state's domestic law, necessarily substantiated by the
content of international law. International law merely sets the perimeters
inside which states have sovereign lawmaking authority (to the extent
that they do not legislatively act contrary to international law-by en-
dorsing universal crimes).36 It follows that states may grant their courts
jurisdiction over any subject matter they please within these territorial
and national prescriptive perimeters. The same cannot be said of univer-
sal jurisdiction-courts' subject matter jurisdiction is circumscribed by
the prescriptive substance of the international law outlawing universal
crimes. Hence if certain State A nationals put into action a program of
extermination of other State A nationals based on the latter group's race
or ethnic identity, courts in State B would have the authority, under in-
ternational law, to prosecute the former group for the universal crime of
genocide. But crucially, State B's adjudicative jurisdiction would be
contingent upon the customary definitional substance of the crime
prosecuted, i.e., genocide. Put differently, absent territorial or national
links or some other legitimating understanding between the states, State
B could not prosecute the State A actors under its municipal code for a
series of homicides; like our traffic code hypothetical, such an applica-
tion would conflict with international law. In sum, a state's universal ad-
judicative jurisdiction is empowered not by the state's own domestic
prescriptive authority-based on, for instance, its authority over national
territory or citizens-but rather, by international law. Consequently,
when states exercise universal jurisdiction they are legally constrained to
36. A question arises where the state, through government power, commits universal crimes
on a grand scale. Such a state arguably has waived its jurisdiction under international law. For ex-
ample, it has been suggested that "[a] State that massively violates the rights of an ethnic minority
risks forfeiture of its rights to control a given part of its territory." Brus, supra note 23, at 13.
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adjudicate the prescriptive substance of the crime under international
law.
The objection immediately will be made, however, that national
courts typically have no authority to pull sua sponte from the sky princi-
ples of international law according to which they may then adjudicate a
matter; instead they must rely upon some domestic law granting them
jurisdiction. And thus, the very idea of international prescriptive juris-
diction depends entirely on domestic law. It follows, the argument goes,
that (contrary to my stated position) the state court that asserts universal
jurisdiction gets its authority not from international law but from that
state's domestic legislation. References to what skeptics might sardoni-
cally label "so-called international law" may make for nice and popular
dicta in the court's opinion, but as a matter of law they are utterly irrele-
vant.
This position misunderstands the international law of jurisdiction. The
principle of universal jurisdiction empowers states in the first instance
with the capacity to adjudicate certain matters where they otherwise
would have no authority to do so. How the sovereign state then author-
izes its own judicial bodies to adjudicate the matter is up to the state's
domestic law (and thus courts are not randomly pulling from the sky in-
ternational law). For instance, the domestic law of the state may indeed
permit the court to draw directly from international law, or domestic law
may incorporate or reflect international law,37 in which case the state
would be using its domestic laws and procedures to adjudicate the sub-
stance of international law. But importantly, for cases of universal juris-
diction the substance of the law must accord with the prescriptive juris-
diction that governs it-that is, it must be international.
37. These two approaches to international law by national legal systems are called monism
and dualism respectively. Under the monist approach to international law,
[tihe state's constitutional system must recognize the supremacy of international law.
The national legislature is bound-constitutionally bound to respect international law
in enacting legislation. The national executive is constitutionally required to take care
that international law be faithfully executed, even in the face of inconsistent domestic
law. The national judiciary must give effect to international law, notwithstanding incon-
sistent domestic law, even domestic law of a constitutional character.
Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 64 (Dordrecht 1995). Dualism, on
the other hand, views international law as the law between sovereign states, a law that is separate
and apart from domestic law. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
30 (1990). Thus, for international law to be part of a dualist state's domestic legal system, it must
be implemented through domestic legislation. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
107 (1991). Most states incorporate aspects of both approaches with regard to the domestic appli-
cation of international law.
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III. THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
If state courts' universal adjudicative jurisdiction depends upon uni-
versal prescriptive jurisdiction as defined by international law, then our
next question asks how to determine the content of this prescriptive ju-
risdiction, or the customary definitions of universal crimes. This Part
contends that the answer lies in the provisions of the widely-ratified and
relatively longstanding multilateral treaties proscribing universal crimes
under positive international law. To frame my argument, I begin with
two distinctions. The first elaborates upon the distinction between the
more procedural law of universal adjudicative jurisdiction and the more
substantive law of universal prescriptive jurisdiction. The second, to be
clear about the customary character of universal jurisdiction, observes
the difference between a treaty-based or "conventional" version of uni-
versal jurisdiction, which necessarily confines itself to the states party to
the convention that generates such jurisdiction, and the customary law of
universal jurisdiction, which extends to all states. I then explain how
treaty provisions prescribing universal crimes provide a strong and eas-
ily-measurable record of customary law's universal prescription as to
those crimes-in other words, the prescriptive jurisdiction that governs
state courts' exercises of universal adjudicative jurisdiction.
A. Adjudicative Versus Prescriptive Universal Jurisdiction
Although universal adjudicative jurisdiction depends upon the sub-
stance of universal prescriptive jurisdiction (or conversely, the substance
of universal prescriptive jurisdiction authorizes universal adjudicative
jurisdiction), the customary rules of universal adjudicative and prescrip-
tive jurisdiction are nonetheless distinct in their character and develop-
ment. Universal adjudicative jurisdiction essentially outlines the proce-
dural connection needed for courts to assert jurisdiction over the
person(s) before it. For universal jurisdiction purposes, this procedural
element exceptionally requires no territorial or national nexus to the ac-
cused criminal over which a court asserts judicial authority.38
38. The conventional or positive law relating to this aspect of jurisdiction is found in treaty
provisions establishing states parties' jurisdiction to prosecute, i.e., the provisions determining
whether states may exercise jurisdiction over acts committed outside their territories, having no
effect on their territories and involving non-nationals. See. e.g., the Torture Convention's prose-
cute-or-extradite provisions set forth infra, note 52.
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My focus here, however, is on universal prescriptive jurisdiction,
which relates more to the subject matter over which the court claims
competence-that is, the substance of universal crime itself. Due per-
haps to a need for legal analysis explaining an increased exercise in the
last decade or so of jurisdiction by courts having no territorial or na-
tional links to the defendants they seek to prosecute, 39 commentary has
concentrated unevenly on the unqualified, and literally global ambit of
universal adjudicative jurisdiction, 40 while important aspects of the pre-
scriptive scope and definition of universal crimes themselves have been
overlooked. To illustrate, piracy is commonly understood as a core uni-
versal crime because throughout international legal history any state's
courts could prosecute the pirate absent territorial or national links to
him or his piratical acts, and more recently, such adjudicative procedure
has been strongly endorsed in conventional law.4 1 But the question of
what precisely "piracy" is as a matter of customary law has garnered lit-
tle attention 42 -and yet, as we have seen, this customary definition de-
termines the legal availability of a given court's universal subject matter
jurisdiction. To take a more modem and contentious example, "terror-
ism" has been rejected by courts as a crime of universal jurisdiction. The
reason for this rejection stems not from a void of state practice favoring
far-reaching adjudicative jurisdiction over the perpetrators of this type of
crime, but rather from the absence of a coherent customary definition of
39. See LUc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 1 (2003) (noting that "[m]ore cases of 'universal jurisdiction' have been reported
in the past decade than throughout the whole history of modern international law.").
40. Commentary has tended to focus almost exclusively on the availability of universal juris-
diction for courts-i.e., adjudicative jurisdiction, without discussing the substance of the crime
itself-i.e., prescriptive jurisdiction. See, e.g., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 21-
25 (listing various universal crimes but not explaining how to define them and dealing largely
with procedural issues such as due process, extradition, evidence-gathering, immunities, statutes
of limitations, amnesties, resolution of competing jurisdictions, double jeopardy, and settlement of
disputes between states with concurrent jurisdictional claims). The author has found one article
that discusses universal jurisdiction as a prescriptive jurisdiction, but only to make the point that
while a state's universal prescriptive jurisdiction is extraterritorial, jurisdiction to enforce is terri-
torial. See Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction - Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 735 (2004) (dealing primarily with the ICJ opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, and
not discussing the nature of the prescriptive jurisdiction under the universality principle, the main
focus of this Essay).
41. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International
Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 47-48 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
42. For an historical account of the crime that highlights confusion about what set piracy apart
from other actions on the high seas, see Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Uni-
versal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183 (2004).
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"terrorism." 43 In the words of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in the recent Yousef opinion:
Unlike those offenses supporting universal jurisdiction under cus-
tomary international law-that is, piracy, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity-that now have fairly precise definitions and
that have achieved universal condemnation, 'terrorism' is a term
as loosely deployed as it is powerfully charged.... No consensus
has developed on how to properly define 'terrorism' generally....
[Such] strenuous disagreement among States about what actions
do or do not constitute terrorism... [means that] terrorism-unlike
piracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity-does not pro-
vide a basis for universal jurisdiction.44
Thus the answer to the question of how to determine the customary
definitional content of universal crimes is of increasing legal and practi-
cal importance.
On my view, developed below, that the answer lies in the substnative
definitions of treaties, the international crime at issue in Yousef, which
involved planting and exploding a bomb on a civilian aircraft-not ab-
stractly "terrorism"---clearly would be subject to universal jurisdiction.
The relevant international instrument, the 1971 Montreal Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
not only evidences a custom of universal adjudicative jurisdiction by
providing for extraterritorial and extra-national jurisdiction over alleged
plane-bombers,45 it fills the prescriptive customary hole that so worried
43. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
44. Id. at 87-89 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
45. Article 5 of the Montreal Convention provides that:
Each Contracting State shall.. .take such measures as may be necessary to establish its ju-
risdiction over the offences [defined].. .in the case where the alleged offender is present
in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Article 7 states:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it
does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the
offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same man-
ner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 181-82 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention]. For a discussion of how these provisions evidence custom, see Colangelo,
supra note 3, at 598:
A state's entrance into a treaty with other states and commitment to be bound thereby
constitutes the maximal expression of state sovereignty and "assent" to the particular
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the Second Circuit by prescribing a definite international law articula-
tion of the crime of plane-bombing. 46 Thus while "terrorism" abstractly-
labeled may not be subject to universal jurisdiction because of its defini-
tional uncertainty, certain clearly-defined acts of terrorism, like plane-
bombing, are.47
B. "Conventional" Versus Customary Universal Jurisdiction
But treaties and custom are of course essentially different types of
law. And like all bases of jurisdiction in international law, "[u]niversal
jurisdiction is a fundamentally customary, not treaty-based, law."48 So
before we make the jump from treaty definitions to customary defini-
tions, one more distinction should be made between what might be
called treaty-based or "conventional" universal jurisdiction on the one
hand, and customary universal jurisdiction on the other. So-called "con-
ventional" universal jurisdiction is somewhat of an oxymoron, or at the
least, a misnomer. Because such jurisdiction is rooted in treaty law, it
provides neither in fact, nor in law, a truly "universal" jurisdiction. 49 It
rules contained in that treaty; the state's implementing legislation pursuant to the treaty
compounds this assent by demonstrating a "general usage and practice" designed to en-
force those rules; and finally, "the [state's] judicial decisions recognize and enforce that
law" in practice.
The Montreal Convention, which was put into effect in 1971, currently has 173 states
parties, which means that in the last thirty years the vast majority of states in the world
have agreed to bind themselves to and put into practice through domestic legislation and
judicial enforcement the provisions of the treaty. [And while] the Montreal Convention
"creates a basis for the assertion ofjurisdiction that is moored in a process of formal law-
making and that is binding only on the States that accede to it[,1"... it is precisely this
process of formal lawmaking between sovereign states, their mutual assent to the rule
agreed upon, and their affirmative adoption and implementation of this rule in domestic
legislation and judicial decisionmaking that constitutes evidence of the customary rule.
What is important to keep in mind is that the treaty, the municipal legislation, and the ju-
dicial opinion are not themselves customary international law; rather they make up the
abs olute best evidence of what a state, the United States, and all other states party to the
Montreal Convention consider to be a legally binding practice-and in this respect sup-
ply the most powerful evidence possible of customary international law there is.
(internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
46. Article 1 of the Montreal Convention defines the offense as:
unlawfully and intentionally.. .plac[ing] or caus[ing] to be placed on an aircraft in ser-
vice, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that air-
craft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to
it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight....
Montreal Convention, supra note 46, at art. 1
47. Colangelo, supra note 3, at 594-603
48. Id. at 567; see also Yousef 327 F.3d at 96 n.29.
49. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
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merely vests a comprehensive jurisdiction for states party to a conven-
tion inter se with respect to the prosecution of a crime that is the subject
of the convention; states party may (and in some cases are obliged to) -
under the jurisdictional provisions of the convention--exercise their ad-
judicative jurisdiction absent territorial or national links to the offense
that the convention prescriptively defines and outlaws. Though the con-
vention's prescriptive mandate-i.e., the proscription on the crime-
ostensibly binds all states party all the time, conventions tend to limit
procedurally the exercise of a state courts' adjudicative jurisdiction, ab-
sent territorial or national links to the crime, to instances where the al-
leged offender is afterwards present or "found" in that state party's terri-
tory and it does not extradite him to another state party. 50
To illustrate, the Torture Convention prescriptively defines and bans
the crime of torture for states party to the Convention. 5' And through its
prosecute-or-extradite provisions,52 the Convention provides for an
equivalent of universal adjudicative jurisdiction over torture as among
the states party. As a matter of positive law, however, both the Conven-
tion's prescriptive ban on torture and its grant of extraterritorial and ex-
tra-national adjudicative capacity to courts to prosecute torturers com-
prehend only the jurisdictions of those states party to the Convention. 53
In other words, the Torture Convention does not, on its own, bind non-
USE IT 64 (1994) (explaining that treaty-based jurisdiction is never "universal jurisdiction stricto
sensu" because such jurisdiction concerns only the states parties to the treaty).
50. This provision is commonly referred to as a "prosecute-or-extradite" provision, or aut
dedere autjudicare.
51. Torture Convention, supra note 21, at 197; see also Appendix F, infra.
52. Torture Convention, supra note 21, at 198. Article 5(2) of the convention provides that
"[e]ach State Party shall...take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdic-
tion and it dos not extradite him...." And Article 7(1) provides:
The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have com-
mitted any offence referred to in [the relevant provision] is found shall in the cases con-
templated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent au-
thorities for the purpose of prosecution.
Id. at 198.
Lori Damrosch has noted that "at a minimum all the prosecute-or-extradite crimes [like torture]
are ones as to which there is an option to exercise jurisdiction without any link to the crime other
than custody of the offender." Lori F. Damrosch, Connecting the Threads in the Fabric ofInterna-
tional Law, in UNIVERSAL JURiSDICTION 91, supra note 33, at 94 (emphasis in original).
53. For instance, Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that
"[a] Treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent," and
Article 35 provides that treaties are only binding on non-parties where the non-party "State ex-
pressly accepts that obligation in writing." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, arts. 34 & 35, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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parties.
By contrast, the customary basis of universal jurisdiction over torture,
both in terms of its prescriptive ban on the crime and in terms of its ad-
judicative scope allowing all states' courts to prosecute the crime, ex-
tends beyond those states party to the Torture Convention to contem-
plate the jurisdiction of all states-making jurisdiction in fact, and in
law, "universal." So if State A and State B are parties to the Torture
Convention, and State B asserts jurisdiction pursuant to the Convention
over a State A national found in State B for torture committed in State A
against other State A nationals, State B is not exercising universal juris-
diction, but is simply discharging its treaty obligations. 54 Similarly, in
Yousef, while the Second Circuit found that it did not have universal ju-
risdiction as a matter of customary law, it did find jurisdiction under the
Montreal Convention and its domestic implementing legislation with re-
spect to acts committed by a Pakistani national, which killed and injured
Japanese nationals on a Philippine flag airliner flying from the Philip-
pines to Japan (there was no evidence that a U.S. citizen was even
aboard the flight).55 Critically, in the Torture Convention hypothetical,
and in Yousef, both the prosecuting and the territorial states were parties
to the applicable conventions 56 and the prosecuting states used the pre-
scriptive definitions of the crimes contained in the conventions.57
To place the jurisdictional competence of the prosecuting state in the
torture hypothetical outside of that vested by the treaty, we would need
to make either State A (the territorial state), or State B (the prosecuting
state), or both, non-parties to the Convention. Plainly if either both State
54. This was essentially the reasoning of Lord Browne-Wilkinson speaking for the English
House of Lords in Pinochet III, where he concluded that Pinochet could be extradited to Spain
under the Torture Convention since
the states with the most obvious jurisdiction.. .do not seek to extradite, the state where
the alleged torturer is found must prosecute or, apparently, extradite to another country,
i.e. there is universal jurisdiction .... Since Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom are all
parties to the Convention, they are bound under treaty by its provisions whether or not
such provisions would apply in the absence of treaty obligation.
THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 19. The Netherlands also recently convicted a torturer absent
territorial or national links to his crimes which occurred in the former Zaire (now Democratic Re-
public of the Congo) based on the Dutch implementation of the Torture Convention's provisions.
See 51 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 439, 444-49 (2004).
55. Yousef 327 F.3d at 97, 108-10.
56. Id. at 109 n.43.
57. Id. at 110 (observing that the domestic implementing legislation "carefully tracks the text
of the Montreal Convention"). As to the definition of the crime in particular, the Montreal Con-
vention and 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) define the crime in substantively identical terms, see infra note
69.
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A and State B are non-parties, or just State B is a non-party, State B can-
not pretend to assert jurisdiction based on a treaty to which it is not
party, and which accordingly does not vest it with jurisdiction. But what
about the scenario in which State B is a party to the Convention and
State A is not? Can State B still prosecute a State A national for torture
committed in State A against only State A nationals based on the positive
law of the Torture Convention? The answer would seem to be no, and
the reason is that the Torture Convention, by itself, does not extend its
prescriptive jurisdiction outlawing torture into the territory of non-
parties, i.e., State A. And therefore, State B, acting pursuant only to the
Convention, would have no positive prescriptive jurisdiction authorizing
its adjudicative jurisdiction under the Convention.
The State B prosecution could, however, rely on the customary law of
universal jurisdiction because its prescriptive jurisdiction does extend
into the territory of all states to proscribe torture, and likewise vests all
states with the adjudicative jurisdiction to prosecute the torturer. But
State B's customary adjudicative jurisdiction would only be valid insofar
as it accords with the governing customary prescriptive jurisdiction. And
so we come back to the question of how to determine the prescriptive
substance of universal crimes under customary law.
C. Treaties and the Prescriptive Substance of Universal Crimes
As we have seen, unlike treaties and other positive law instruments
that affect only those states that have signed onto them through a formal
international lawmaking process, customary law is universal in its appli-
cation. Moreover, it is evidenced by and evolves organically in light of
state practice conditioned by opinio juris. Such practice is manifest, for
instance, in the state's entrance into a treaty. The idea that generalizable
or "norm-creating" treaty provisions-like, for example, proscriptions
on internationally agreed-upon crimes-generate customary law is not
new 58 and is, in the words of the International Court of Justice, "indeed
one of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary interna-
58. Professor D'Amato first made the argument over forty years ago in his article Treaties as
a Source of General Rules of International Law, 3 HARV. INT'L L.J. I (1962); see also ANTHONY
A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-66 (1971) [hereinafter
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM]; see also D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights, supra
note 32 at 1127-47. See generally Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Prob-
lem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1988); Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral
Treaties and the Formation of Customary International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71
(1996).
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tional law may be formed. '59 Although some might feel the need to
temper the formation of custom through treaty by requiring a certain
threshold number of states party to the treaty or the passage of a certain
amount of time before its provisions could constitute custom,60 this Es-
say needs not go so far for its argument. Each of the treaties prohibiting
universal crimes enjoys longstanding and widespread acceptance; in-
deed, and as the Appendix bears out, the treaties themselves even tend to
avow either an explicit or implicit purpose to codify or create custom in
their respective areas of international lawmaking. 6' That treaties do so is,
again, nothing new for international law. The Nuremberg Tribunal, for
instance, applied to the accused Nazi war criminals before it, as a matter
of customary law, the detailed provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention
and the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Prisoners of War.62 The Tribu-
nal, citing no state practice other than that of states agreeing upon the
rules contained in, and entering into, these treaties, observed that the
rules were "declaratory of the laws and customs of war." 63 As Anthony
D'Amato points out, "[iut strains credulity to suppose that state practice
had become so detailed by 1939-particularly between 1929, the date of
the Geneva Convention, and 1939!-that the conventions were merely
'declaratory' of such practice. Rather, the more reasonable interpretation
is that the conventions 'declared' what the practice is by virtue of the
fact that the signatories undertook to declare that practice operative un-
der the conventions themselves." 64
The argument from treaty law engages therefore not just the prohibi-
tion on the crime but also the articulation of its content. It goes beyond
59. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb.
20); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(3) (1987) ("International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to
the creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by
states generally and are in fact widely accepted.").
60. See generally Scott & Carr, supra note 59.
61. See Appendix, infra. The express or implied avowal of generating custom, when but-
tressed by the history of actions and reactions of states in respect to these treaties, would seem to
take care of Dr. Michael Akehurst's concerns that opinio juris must accompany a treaty for its
provisions to create custom; the ways in which he sees this criterion satisfied are a declaratory
statement in the treaty or its preparatory materials to this effect, or by subsequent practice and
opiniojuris supporting the rule. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, in
THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1974-1975 1, 45, 49 (R.Y Jennings & Ian
Brownlie eds., 1977).
62. International Military Tribunal Judgment, in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION:
OPINION AND JUDGMENT 83 (1947).
63. Id.
64. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 59, at 123.
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accepting that genocide is prohibited as a matter of international law be-
cause the Genocide Convention prohibits it-treaties are the source of
most if not all international human rights norms in this regard65 -to con-
tend that the substantive definition of the crime is reflected in the treaty
provisions and, in line with Part II of this Essay, that it is a definition to
which courts must adhere in exercising universal jurisdiction. Again, I
do not argue that the treaty provisions setting forth penal characteristics
constitute themselves definitively the customary definitions of universal
crimes; rather, these provisions make up strong evidence of what the
customary definitions are. It follows too that definitions contained in
legislation implementing domestically a state's treaty obligations or
simply transposing onto domestic law the treaty's definitional provisions
are particularly useful to courts since these domestic-law definitions re-
produce, by their very nature, the substance of the conduct prohibited by
the treaty.66 My model necessarily allows for some flexibility in the
definitions of the crimes insofar as domestic legislation does not sub-
stantively alter the definition of the treaty provision it transforms into
domestic law. 67 Even apart from obvious differences that will result
from translating the treaty provisions into different languages for pur-
poses of domestic legislation, slight variations on the language are al-
most inevitable given the universal prescriptions of treaties as compared
to the more state-specific prescriptions of domestic legislation. 68 Using
65. See D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights, supra note 32, at 1128-48.
66. Of course, if the implementing legislation does not reproduce faithfully the crime as set
forth in the treaty, the state would be in violation of its treaty obligations, and consequently, the
definitions in the implementing legislation would not reflect the customary definitions of the
crime (as set forth in the treaty).
67. An example of an improper substantive alteration of a treaty definition is Germany's for-
mer Criminal Code § 220a, which translated the definition of genocide contained in the 1948
Genocide Convention into German law. Under the Convention's provisions, the act of genocide is
defined as "Idleliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part." The translation in § 220a criminalizes "inflict[ing] on the
group conditions apt to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." Kai Ambos &
Steffen Wirth, Genocide and War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia Before German Criminal
Courts, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 769, 784-786 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2004) (emphasis in secondary source). Ambos and
Wirth explain that the use of the word "apt" in the literal German translation "substantially
changes the elements of the inflicting-destructive-conditions-[provision] of genocide with respect
to both the ordinary meaning and the travaux pr~paratoires of the Convention." Id. at 786
68. To take one example, the Montreal Convention, supra note 46, provides for the equivalent
of universal jurisdiction over anyone who
unlawfully and intentionally:
places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a de-
2006]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 47:1
positive international law as the starting point for determining the sub-
stance of universal crimes accommodates the modification of definitions
through evolutions in customary law regarding the crimes while pres-
ently providing courts with harmonized and fairly precise definitions
that safeguard, among other things, bedrock criminal law principles of
legality, "namely, no crime without a law, no punishment without a
law" 69 in the context of international criminal law.
70
There is, however, a circularity problem. How can state practice
change the customary definitions of universal crimes if states are legally
constrained in their exercise of universal jurisdiction to use, as it were,
the customary definitions "as they exist"? This circularity problem tends
to afflict customary international law generally. 71 The easy solution for
our purposes would be for states to get together and simply change the
definition of the crime through an amendment to the relevant treaty, or
vice or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which
renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its
safety in flight.
The U.S. implementing legislation, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) (1996), similarly provides
for jurisdiction over
[w]hoever willfully--
places or causes to be placed on a civil aircraft registered in a country other than the
United States while such aircraft is in service, a device or substance which is likely to
destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to that aircraft which renders that aircraft inca-
pable of flight or which is likely to endanger that aircraft's safety in flight.
69. Bassiouni, supra note 42, at 45.
70. The history and development of international criminal law has relied on less stringent le-
gality requirements than what might be found under domestic law. See Jordan J. Paust, It's No
Defense: Nullum Crimen, International Crime and the Gingerbread Man, 60 ALB. L. REV. 657,
664-671 (1997); Alfred P. Rubin, Is International Criminal Law "Universal"?, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 351, 357-363 (2001). Thus, so long as states do not expand the definitions of the crimes
beyond their customary meanings, states may specify further the definitions of the crime as set
forth in a treaty to comport with more stringent domestic legality requirements, as are typical in
civil law, code-based systems. For instance, Germany's Code of Crimes Against International
Law transforms the ICC crimes into domestic legislation. "Each crime was, however, reformu-
lated into language consistent with German legal terminology, and to ensure that [sic], as required
by the German Constitution, the crimes were clearly defined at the time of the commission of the
act." Steffen Wirth, Germany's New International Crimes Code: Bringing a Case to Court, I J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 151, 153 (2003). The drafters of the ICC evidently were also concerned with
specificity problems and therefore agreed to promulgate more specific "Elements of Crimes,"
which are "non-binding guidelines for the Court, aids for application and interpretation designed
to help judges and prosecutors as well as legal counsels appearing in cases before the Court."
Wiebke Riuckert & Georg Witschel, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in the Elements of
Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 68, at 61.
71. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102 reporters' note 2 (1987).
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to create a new instrument relating to that crime. This process has taken
place to some extent with respect to crimes spelled out in the statute for
the newly-established International. Criminal Court and to a lesser de-
gree (since they are not treaties, strictly speaking) in the statutes of vari-
ous international tribunals created under the auspices of the United Na-
tions. For example, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
under which the Nazis were prosecuted defined crimes against humanity
as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhu-
mane acts committed against any civilian populations...., 72 Although
acts such as torture, imprisonment, and rape could potentially fall into
the "other inhumane acts" receptacle, they are not set forth explicitly in
the Charter and courts using its definitional provisions therefore would
be on more precarious ground prosecuting these crimes as universal
crimes against humanity than in prosecuting a listed offense such as "ex-
termination" or "enslavement." Yet by the end of the last century, inter-
national law evolved such that the statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the ICC Statute,
do affirmatively list torture, imprisonment and rape as crimes against
humanity, 73 thus clarifying or perhaps adding to the customary defini-
tions of crimes against humanity and, in any event, providing courts
with firmer prosecutorial footing as to certain of these crimes. Judicial
opinions also may contribute to the development or clarification of the
definitions under customary law. For example, although the Genocide
Convention nowhere explicitly mentions rape in its list of acts that may
qualify as genocide when "committed with the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such,, 74 international criminal tribunal judgments make clear that acts
constituting genocide encompass acts of rape committed with the requi-
site mens rea. 5
72. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis art. 6(c), August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
73. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, at
art. 5, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, at art. 3,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July
17, 1998) [hereinafter ICC statute].
74. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 11, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
75. See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, 53 (Dec. 6, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95- I-T, Judgment, 117 (May 21, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 507-08 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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But all these examples are of legal developments engineered by quin-
tessentially international agreements or institutions. More difficult is the
question of when and how national courts advance customary law in
domestic proceedings that apply international law, including, naturally,
exercises of universal jurisdiction. We can say, for instance, that if the
consistent and widespread practice of states prosecuting the international
crime of genocide deems intent to destroy a group based on its political
self-identification to satisfy the mens rea component of the crime, the
customary definition of genocide has expanded to include within its vic-
tim class political groups along with the national, ethnic and racial
groups carved out by the Genocide Convention. But the first state to ex-
tend the definition in this way violates customary law by improperly as-
serting jurisdiction over a crime that-at that moment-prescriptively
does not qualify as universal. 76 Yet customary law's recursive constitu-
tion may immediately reduce the illegality of that act if interested
states-say, the alleged universal criminal's state of national citizenship
and/or the state on whose territory the crime occurred-acquiesce in or
approve of the universal jurisdictional assertion.77 And particularly if
other states then prosecute genocide in a way that recognizes political
groups as victims, the first state's illegal act will have planted a custom-
ary "seed,"7 8 the cultivation of which, by state practice, will have modi-
fied the customary definition of genocide. The possibility of custom
evolving beyond treaty definitions was even expressly built into the ICC
Statute. 9
Evolutions in custom likewise may alter and even expand the capacity
of states to allow procedurally for universal adjudicative jurisdiction
over the perpetrators of international crimes. For instance, while like the
Torture Convention, a number of positive instruments dealing with uni-
76. This especially would be the case in this example because including political groups in
this victim classification was debated and rejected in the drafting of the Genocide Convention. For
a history of the drafting debate on this issue see Beth Van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political
Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's Blind Spot, 106 YALE L. J. 2259, 2262-2269
(1997).
77. I discuss this point in more detail, see Part IV, infra.
78. Anthony D'Amato, The Theory Of Customary International Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 242, 246 (1988); D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"?, supra note 32, at 1310-
II; D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 59, at 97-98.
79. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July
17, 1998) ("Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing
or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute."). For a detailed
analysis of Article 10, see Leila Nadya Sadat, Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts About the
Relationship Between the Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 909 (2000).
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versal crimes provide for extraterritorial and extra-national jurisdiction
by state courts over alleged offenders (the conventional equivalent of
universal adjudicative jurisdiction), the Genocide Convention does not.
In fact, extraterritorial jurisdiction was explicitly rejected in the Conven-
tion's drafting.8 0 Thus to accept genocide as a universal crime, one must
view custom as having expanded the adjudicative scope of jurisdiction
as to genocide beyond that envisaged by the treaty to encompass the ju-
risdiction of all states, irrespective of the place of the crime.
But again, my focus here is on prescriptive jurisdiction, or the sub-
stance of the universal crime under international law. Because, as we
have seen, treaties furnish neither definitive nor exhaustive definitions of
universal crimes due to the organic nature of customary law, courts may
not always be obliged to use the precise definitional language of the
treaty when exercising universal jurisdiction, though it will often be the
case that the treaty definition is the best-not to mention the most read-
ily available-evidence of custom. In fact, the practice of universal ju-
risdiction evidences this latter point.
To begin with, states' domestic laws facilitating universal jurisdiction
flow routinely from the criminalization of the conduct in question at the
level of international conventional law. These domestic laws may, for
instance, fulfill a state's obligations under a treaty and thus, either
through specific implementing legislation (typical in common law coun-
tries) or general enabling clauses making the treaty provisions directly
applicable (typical in civil law countries),8 ' translate into national law
80. For a detailed and persuasive explanation of this point, see REYDAMS, supra note 41, at
48-53.
81. For example, Austria's criminal code provision providing for universal jurisdiction states
that extraterritorial, extra-national jurisdiction applies to "criminal offences, if Austria is under an
obligation to prosecute them-even if committed abroad-irrespective of the penal law of the
State where they were committed." Strafgestzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §64(1)(6) (Austria),
translated in REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 94. "The term 'obligation' in §64(1) subparagraph 6
refers to a treaty obligation." REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 97. Another example is Belgium's Code
de procedure p~nale, titre preliminare, article 12 bis, which has a general enabling clause that
reads: "The Belgian courts are competent to take cognizance of offences committed outside the
territory of the Kingdom that are the object of an international convention binding on Belgium if
the convention obliges in any way to submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution." REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 105. Likewise, Denmark's Straffeloven [Strfl] §
8(1)(5) (Denmark), provides: "Acts committed outside the territory of the Danish State, shall also
come within Danish criminal jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator where
the act is covered by an international convention in pursuance of which Denmark is under an obli-
gation to start legal proceedings." REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 127. An enabling provision ap-
pears also in France's criminal code with respect to self-executing treaties. REYDAMS, supra note
40, at 132-33. Somewhat of a departure from this model, the German code, StGB, supra, § 6,
"Offences Against Internationally Protected Interests or Rights" lists international crimes over
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the international substance of the crime for courts to prosecute. Preva-
lent examples include domestic legislation regarding the Torture Con-
vention, 82 the Genocide Convention, 83 and the Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocol 184 -this latter legislation has, in a number of
states, been substituted for by legislation implementing the newly estab-
lished ICC.85 Some legislation expressly declares its purpose in this re-
gard. The since-tamed Belgian War Crimes Act,86 under which Belgian
courts have prosecuted a number of Rwandan war criminals for acts
committed in Rwanda against Rwandans, 87 had as its purpose "to define
which universal jurisdiction exists-all of which, except for one, are directly the subject of an in-
ternational treaty-and provides a catch-all provision that provides jurisdiction over "acts that are
to be prosecuted by the terms of an international treaty binding on the federal republic of Germany
even if they are committed outside the country." REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 142. Spain's Ley
Orghnica del Poder Judicial, article 23.4 follows this model as well, listing offenses prohibited
under conventional international law, and providing also for jurisdiction over "any other offence
which Spain is obliged to prosecute under an international treaty or convention." REYDAMS, supra
note 40, at 183. The Netherlands' 2003 International Crimes Act, which amended the Wartime
Offenses Act and implements in part the ICC Statute, likewise draws from treaty law to define the
offenses over which it provides universal jurisdiction, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity,
torture and grave breaches (and even non-grave breaches) of the Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocol I. See International Crimes Act of 19 June 2003, English version available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/fb9070f8fc60c047c I 256da30032f0b0?OpenDocument.
82. See Australia's Crimes (Torture) Act, 1988, translated in REYDAMS supra note 40, at 89-
90; Uitvoeringswet Folteringsverdrag [The Netherlands' Act Implementing the Torture Conven-
tion], id. at 167-69.
83. See Israel's Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law 1950, see REYDAMS,
supra note 40, at 160; Switzerland's Code penal Suisse, title l2bis, Offences Against the Interests
of the International Community, id. at 195.
84. See Australia's Geneva Conventions Act 1957, translated in REYDAMS supra note 40, at
87-88; Belgium's War Crimes Act, which goes beyond the conventional law to add conduct from
Additional Protocol II (non-grave-breaches), and subsequently was amended to add genocide and
crimes against humanity, id. at 106-107, but implementation of the law has been substantially re-
stricted through amendment due to international pressure, see supra note 1; Canada's Geneva
Conventions Act, REYDAMS supra note 40, at 120; the Netherlands' Crimes in Wartime Act, id at
167; Switzerland's Code penal militaire, articles 9(1) and 109(l) and Code penal Suisse, article
6bis, id. at 195-196.
85. See Australia's International Criminal Court Act 2002, REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 88-
89; Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act which "incorporates the provisions
of the ICC Statute into Canadian legislation," id. at 122-124; Germany's Code of Crimes Against
International Law, "which makes the core ICC crimes offences under domestic law," id. at 144;
the United Kingdom's International Criminal Court Act 2001, which limits universal jurisdiction
to foreigners either resident when the offense was committed, or subsequently become resident
and reside in the U.K. at the time proceedings are brought, id. at 206. See REYDAMS, supra note
40, at Part II: Universal Jurisdiction in Municipal Law (discussing the exercise of universal juris-
diction by fourteen states). For specific examples, see pg. 87-90 (Australia), 97 (Austria), 105-07
(Belgium), 120-24 (Canada), 127 (Denmark), 132-34 (France), 142-46 (Germany), 159 (Israel),
165-69 (the Netherlands), 183-84 (Spain), 193-96 (Switzerland), 204-06 (United Kingdom).
86. See Ratner, supra note 9.
87. See Luc Reydams, Belgium's First Application of Universal Jurisdiction: The Butare Four
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three categories of grave breaches of humanitarian law and to integrate
them into the Belgian domestic legal order." 88 In fact, "[t]o remain con-
sistent with the definitions used in international law, the Act textually
refers to the wording of the relevant provisions of the international con-
ventions." 89 And its definitional provisions even explicitly invoke the
relevant conventions by name; for example, the Act sets forth the defini-
tion of genocide after stating that the crime is defined "[i]n accordance
with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 9 December 1948. "9o
As a result of this legislative translation of international law into na-
tional law, the practice of courts has been to use positive international
law (as reflected in national law) to define the subject universal offense
when exercising universal jurisdiction. To take one of the earliest and
most well-known examples of universal jurisdiction, the definitions of
"war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" contained in the Nazi and
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law under which the Israeli Supreme
Court convicted Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann for acts which
Case, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 428 (2003). Some of these convictions are problematic under interna-
tional law. For example, as Reydams points out:
Some of the war crimes of which one of the defendants, Higaniro, was convicted took
place when there was no armed conflict at all in Rwanda. The two incendiary reports at-
tributed to him dated from late 1993 and early 1994. Contrary to the prosecutor's asser-
tion, there was no armed conflict in Rwanda between 4 August 1993 (date of the Arusha
Peace Accords) and 6 April 1994. While sporadic violent incidents took place during this
period they did not reach the threshold of application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocol II.
Id. at 435.
88. Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, Introductory Note to Belgium: Act Concerning the
Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 38 I.L.M. 918, 919 (1999).
89. Id.
90. Id. at art. 1, § 1. Although the Act formally adopts the prescriptive definitions of the
crimes from conventional law, like the Netherlands' International Crimes Act it went beyond con-
ventional law regarding the adjudicative availability of universal jurisdiction over "grave
breaches" by including within this category acts that were not committed as part of an interna-
tional conflict. Smis and Van der Borght explain that
contrary to the Geneva law, the Belgian Act does not make a distinction between interna-
tional and non-international conflicts for the purposes of defining grave breaches. In fact,
pursuant to [the Conventions], the term "grave breaches" is only applicable to interna-
tional armed conflicts. The violations of humanitarian law in non-international armed
conflicts (Additional Protocol II) do not fall within the ambit of the [legislative] under-
taking referred to in [connection with grave breaches]. However, considering the number
of violations of international humanitarian law that are committed in non-international
conflicts, the Belgian legislator found it wise to extend the application of "grave
breaches" to violations of the laws of war committed during internal conflicts.
Id. at 920.
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were-leaving no doubt as to the universal basis of the jurisdiction-
committed before Israel was even a state, embodied the definitions of
the respective crimes in the Nuremberg Charter.9' The Israeli Supreme
Court justified its competence to judge Eichmann on the grounds that
"international law [enforces itself] by authorizing the countries of the
world to mete out punishment for the violation of its provisions, which
is effected by putting these provisions into operation either directly or by
virtue of municipal legislation which has adopted and integrated
them. 92 Quoting the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Court observed that "the
Charter, with all the principles embodied in it-including that of indi-
vidual responsibility-must be seen as 'the expression of international
law existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent (the Charter) is
itself a contribution to international law."' 93 The Charter had, in the
words of the Court, "formed part of the customary law of nations."94
Consequently, through the enactment of the law, the Israeli legislature
"gave effect to international law and its objectives. 95 The United States
endorsed universal jurisdiction over these precise crimes-as defined
91. The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law defines the crimes as "crime against
humanity" means any of the following acts:
murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or deportation and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, and persecution on national, racial, religious
or political grounds;
"war crime" means any of the following acts:
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to forced labour or for any other purpose, of civilian
population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or per-
sons on the seas; killing of hostages; plunder of public or private property; wanton de-
struction of cities, towns or villages; and devastation not justified by military necessity.
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting the The Nazi and Nazi Col-
laborators (Punishment) Law). The Nuremberg Charter defines the crimes as:
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to salve labor or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill treat-
ment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity.
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the
war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds....
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
arts. 6(b), 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
92. Judgment reproduced in English, 2 LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR 1664 (Fred L. Is-
rael & William Hansen eds., 1972).
93. Id. at 1666 (quoting I.M.T. (1947), vol. 1, 218).
94. Id. at 1667.
95. Id. at 1668..
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under Israeli law-when it subsequently extradited another war crimi-
nal, John Demjanjuk, to Israel for prosecution in connection with crimes
he had allegedly committed as a World War 1I concentration camp
guard.96 Ruling the extradition legal under national and international
law, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the definitions
of the crimes contained in the Israeli law and held that Israel had univer-
sal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity. 97 More re-
cently, France's Court of Cassation found jurisdiction over a Rwandan
national for crimes committed in Rwanda during that country's civil war
based on France's domestic legislation implementing the Torture Con-
vention, and despite the fact that Rwanda was not party to the Conven-
tion.98 The Court held that French courts were competent to "judge per-
sons who could be guilty, in a foreign country, of tortures," under the
Torture Convention's definition of the crime, 99 which is incorporated by
reference into the French Penal Code through article 689-2 of the Penal
Procedures Code.'00 Furthermore, courts also use the decisions and
judgments of international tribunals to inform their application of inter-
national law. For example, in convicting on universal jurisdiction
grounds Adolfo Scilingo, an Argentine naval captain, for his involve-
ment in "death flights" during Argentina's military rule from 1976-1983,
Spain's Audiencia Nacional drew from the case law of the ICTY and the
text of the ICC to specify, among other things, the elements of crimes
against humanity under international law, the character of the civilian
96. Demjanjuk was later acquitted by the Israeli Supreme Court on these specific charges due
to flaws in the documents identifying him as "Ivan the terrible," the guard against which the
charges were directed. Based on evidence that he was nonetheless a concentration camp guard,
Demjanjuk's legal battles continue. For a summary see Nathan Guttman, Demjanjuk To Appeal
US Decision To Deport Him, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at 5.
97. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-583 (6th Cir. 1985).
98. See United Nations, Status of ratification of the Convention against Torture,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-ratify.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
99. Cour de Cassation [Cass. Crim] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction], Jan. 6, 1998. Nr.
X 96-82.491 Pf. Nr. Y 96-82.492, translated in I YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 598, 599 (Horst Fischer, et al. eds., 1998).
100. Article 689-2 reads:
Whoever, outside the territory of the Republic, commits acts qualified as a felony or
delict, which constitute torture within the meaning of the first article of the convention
against torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading penalties or treatment, adopted in
New York on December 10, 1984, may be prosecuted and tried by French courts if he is
found in France.
C. PR. PEN. art. 689-2 (Fr.), translated in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: 29
THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 294 (Edward M. Wise, ed., Gerald L. Kock &
Richard S. Frase trans., 1988) (1964).
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population against which the crimes must be directed, the generalized
and systematic nature of the crimes, and issues of command responsibil-
ity.1
°
Where legislatures or courts depart from the treaties, however, they
are obliged to undertake a rigorous and bonafide inquiry into the status
of customary law to justify the definition they employ. But doesn't this
divination of custom just bring us right back to the initial concern of
courts subjectively defining universal crimes, leading to the legally un-
justified harassment of high-profile individuals for purely political or
sensationalist motives? These claims might stick if the real-world prac-
tice of courts exercising universal jurisdiction wantonly flouted the legal
strictures imposed by universal jurisdiction's prescriptive limits. But in
fact the reported cases of universal jurisdiction reveal that courts by and
large apply faithfully and responsibly the international legal definitions
of universal crimes as evidenced in positive international law.10 2 Where
courts do not-and have no international legal argument to support their
deviation-their violation of international law is readily apparent, and
perhaps most importantly, interested states have a strong legal basis to
reject such claims.
For instance, under this Essay's analysis, Spain's Audiencia Nacional
defied international law when it upheld jurisdiction over former Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet for genocide based on crimes allegedly com-
mitted against a "national group" by stretching this victim class designa-
tion beyond its customary definition to include "a national human group,
a differentiated human group, characterized by some trait, and integrated
into the larger collectivity. '10 3 Finding that the acts alleged constituted
genocide since they were designed "to destroy a differentiated national
group" of political opponents irrespective of their nationalities, i.e.,
"those who did not fit in [Pinochet's] project of national reorganiza-
tion... [whether] Chileans or foreigners,"' 0 4 the court effectively (and
none-too-subtly) amended the victim groups within the definition of
genocide. The court's own conclusory reasoning bespeaks the lack of
legal support for its position;10 5 genocide has been defined consistently
101. American Society of International Law, International Law in Brief, Audiencia Nacional
of Spain: Sentence for Crimes Against Humanity in the Case of Adolfo Scilingo (April 19, 2005),
available at http://www.asil.org/ilib/2005/04/ilib050426.htm#j3.
102. For a comprehensive cataloging with summaries of exercises of universal jurisdiction in
municipal courts, see REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 40, at 81-226.
103. Quoting the English translation in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 19, at 103.
104. Id. at 103-04.
105. Id. at 100. The court's argument relies principally on the former Spanish legislation in
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since the 1948 Genocide Convention in the statutes of international
courts and treaties to have as victim groups only a "national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such."' 0 6 In the words of the ICTR, "a na-
tional group is defined as a collection of people who are perceived to
share a legal bond based on common citizenship."' 0 7 The Audiencia's
sprawling construction eviscerates the "as such" qualifier'0 8 and de facto
enlarges the class of victims to include potentially any group whatso-
ever-including, as in the case before it, political groups, which had
been explicitly rejected as victims in the drafting of the Genocide Con-
vention. 10 9 In short, the ruling clashes with one of the more recognizable
legal demarcations of the crime of genocide under international law.
In sum, and as the Audiencia's exaggerated ruling shows, positive law
articulates not just the substance of universal crimes but also a clear
benchmark against which illicit overreaching may be measured. Where
such overreaching occurs, the rulings conflict with international law and
the exercise of universal jurisdiction is illegitimate. Interested states
therefore have a solid legal basis to oppose the exercise of universal ju-
risdiction in such circumstances. For instance, had the charges concern-
ing Pinochet's extradition from Great Britain-which had arrested the
former dictator pursuant to Spain's request-relied on Spanish allega-
tions of genocide (instead of torture, which ended up being the relevant
place when the acts allegedly were committed, under which the intent element of genocide en-
compassed intent to totally or partially destroy a "national ethnic, religious or social group," id. at
27, 100 (emphasis added), and which was therefore in clear departure from Article 1 of the Geno-
cide Convention which prescribed intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a "national, ethnical, ra-
cial or religious group, as such." See Appendix C, infra.
106. See ICTY Statute, supra note 74, at art. 4; ICTR Statute, supra note 74, at art. 6; ICC
Statute, supra note 74, at art. 6.
107. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 512 (Sept. 2, 1998). Nota-
bly, the jurisprudence of the ICTR has abandoned the notion expressed in the Tribunal's first find-
ing of genocide in Akayesu, at 516, that the victim class could include "any stable and permanent
group"--a definition that would nonetheless still exclude the wholly political group found to be
victims in the Audiencia's ruling. Subsequent rulings have determined that the victims of the
Rwandan genocide, the Tutsi, were indeed an ethnic group within the meaning of the Statute.
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A 934 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kayishema,
Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 95, 98 (May 21, 1999). For an explanation of why the
Akayesu ruling extending the victim class to "stable and permanent groups" based on the travaux
pr~paratoires of the Genocide Convention was wrong, and why the Tutsi constituted a protected
class under the correct definition in any event, see William A. Schabas, The Crime of Genocide in
the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 447, 450-456 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001).
108. The "as such" language was added to "implicitly include" a specific motive. Schabas, su-
pra note 108, at 458.
109. See discussion, supra note 77.
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crime of extradition), 0 Chile would have been perfectly justified in
protesting the legality of Spain's jurisdiction under international law on
the grounds that the basis for jurisdiction-that is, genocide as defined
by the Audiencia's ruling-was faulty."' The idea of states successfully
objecting to the legality of universal jurisdictional assertions is not far-
fetched: Congo successfully obtained a World Court ruling invalidating
a Belgian claim of universal jurisdiction over Congo's then-Minister of
Foreign Affairs on grounds of sovereign immunity," 2 which resulted in
Belgium's repeal of the arrest warrant." 3 Indeed, Chile actively consid-
ered bringing the Pinochet case to the World Court based on its objec-
tions that Pinochet enjoyed immunity 14 (the case was, for practical pur-
poses, resolved when British Secretary of State Jack Straw allowed
Pinochet to return to Chile on medical grounds). 1 5 The legal argument
presented here would have been another arrow in Chile's quiver of legal
objections to Spanish jurisdiction, and quite a sharp one at that. And al-
though it is certainly the most formal avenue, taking the case to the
World Court is by no means the only option among the panoply of
mechanisms by which states may express their legal objections and at-
tempt to protect their legal rights or "entitlements" under international
law, " 6 entitlements such as jurisdictional authority over territory and na-
tionals.
IV. EVOLVING AND ENFORCING THE LIMITS OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION
So far this Essay has argued that universal jurisdiction is a customary
law which, like all customary law, may evolve by violations that gain
110. See THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 19, at 268.
111. As it turns out, Chile did protest the legality of the jurisdiction, but on grounds of diplo-
matic and sovereign immunity. See Susan Cornwell, Chilean Visitors Find Pinochet Looking Well,
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1998, at A19; Laurie Goering, Chile's Response to Pinochet Arrest A
Gauge of Progress, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 1998, at 4; World/Nation Briefs, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7,
1998, at A 12.
112. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J.
121 (Feb. 14).
113. See REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 116.
114. See Goering, supra note 112; Ray Moseley, Chile Will Ask World Court to Intervene for
Pinochet; Ex-Dictator Fighting Extradition to Spain, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1999, at 6.
115. Statement of Secretary of State Jack Straw in the House of Commons, March 2, 2000,
reproduced in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 19, at 481.
116. D'Amato, Is International Law Really Law?, supra note 32, at 1304-07 (describing legal
rights as "entitlements" and applying the terminology to international law); id. at 1310-1313 (ex-
plaining how countermeasures enforce international law).
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acceptance and eventually come to reflect a new consensus of state prac-
tice and opiniojuris. But it has also argued that the treaty-based defini-
tions of universal crimes best evidence custom, and accordingly con-
strain the legitimate exercise of universal jurisdiction by courts. The
tension in these arguments raises perhaps one last question worth ad-
dressing: How can we tell whether a violation of international law re-
sulting from a court's expansion of the treaty definition of a universal
crime (a) signals a possible shift in customary law, or (b) represents an
enduring breach of that law? In other words, how are the legal limits of
universal jurisdiction enforced?
Framed broadly, the question of violations blossoming into custom is
endemic to all customary law, 11 7 but in this particular circumstance the
proper legal analysis may not be too difficult to discern. The answer lies
in the reactions of other jurisdictionally-interested-i.e., national and
territorial-states. The protest and acquiescence of states to what
amounts to an international legal claim by another state has long been
held to be a constitutive element of custom.' 18 And a claim of authority
to prescribe and adjudicate foreign conduct by foreign nationals under a
theory of universal jurisdiction is as clear an international legal claim as
any. Particularly important to the customary calculus are the reactions of
states that have a substantial legal interest in the claim at issue, that is,
states whose legal rights or entitlements are directly implicated by the
claim." 9 In comparison to other areas of international law where it may
be hard to identify and measure the various interests of various states
implicated by a given claim, 120 the universal jurisdiction scenario pre-
sents a relatively clear picture of the interested states and the degree of
their interests. The legally interested states are those states that other-
wise would have jurisdiction over the acts and persons involved; they
are those states whose nationals are the subject of the universal jurisdic-
tion claim and/or whose territories suffered the alleged conduct giving
rise to universal jurisdiction.
117. See supra text accompanying note 78.
118. See Akehurst, supra note 62, at 38-42 (and cases cited therein).
119. Id. at 40
(If an act affects the interests of only one State, protest by that State will carry great
weight... [and] [t]he extent to which a State's interests are affected varies according to
the nature of the act concerned. Failure to protest against an assertion in abstracto about
the content of customary law is less significant than failure to protest against concrete
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Accordingly, where a court asserting universal jurisdiction expands
the definition of the crime upon which it grounds its competence beyond
the crime's customary definition-a definition evidenced largely by
treaty law-the reactions of national and territorial states determine the
customary status of the universal jurisdiction court's definitional expan-
sion.12 1 As we have seen, these states may take a number of measures to
repudiate the legality of the universal jurisdiction state's claim; they
may, for instance, officially protest,1 22 take the case to the World Court
and, naturally, if the universal jurisdiction is asserted in absentia, 23 re-
fuse to extradite the accused. To enforce the definitional limits of the
crime under customary law therefore, states objecting to universal juris-
diction on the grounds set forth above would be well-advised to make
explicit their rejection of the universal jurisdiction court's illegitimate
definitional expansion upon which the court purports to base its compe-
tence.
Consequently, the potential for evolving--or not-the definitions of
universal crimes by the process of customary law-violation-turned-new-
12 1. A non-interested state may try to insulate itself from the definitional expansion of a uni-
versal crime by invoking the persistent objector doctrine of international law, which holds that "a
state that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of development is
not bound by that rule even after it matures." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. d (1987). However, "[h]istorically, such dis-
sent and consequent exemption from a principle that became general customary law has been
rare." Id; see also Ted Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persis-
tent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985) (observing that while histori-
cally rarely invoked, the principle may play a more instrumental role in modern international
lawmaking that occurs through institutional organs such as the United Nations).
122. The contribution of protest alone unaccompanied by some tangible response as a consti-
tutive element of custom is the subject of some controversy. See Akehurst, supra note 63, at 40-
41 (disagreeing with D'Amato's view that unaccompanied protests are not enough to block a new
rule); R.A. Mullerson, New Thinking by Soviet Scholars: Sources of International Law, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 494, 506-07 (1989). In cases of universal jurisdiction, the protest will almost inevitably
be accompanied by some form of response, whether it is a suit against the state asserting universal
jurisdiction or simply a refusal to extradite.
123. The status of universal jurisdiction in absentia is not yet clear under international law.
See Colangelo, supra note 3, at 548-49
(Universal jurisdiction in absentia is presently caught in a customary twilight that will
witness either the development or the dismissal of the practice depending on the actions
and reactions of states in the next part of this century. State practice has not yet worn
into the fabric of international law an affirmative custom of universal jurisdiction in ab-
sentia assertions. At the same time, however, an incipient trend supporting this type of
assertion is emerging, and those who take a permissive view of international law might
legitimately submit that custom does not explicitly prohibit universal jurisdiction in ab-
sentia.)
(internal citations omitted).
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custom rests not with the state asserting universal jurisdiction, but in-
stead most often with the states whose nationals are in the dock. Where
interested states object to the universal jurisdiction assertion by rejecting
an illegitimate definitional expansion of the crime that purports to justify
the universal jurisdiction court's competence, the court's violation repre-
sents an enduring breach of international law. In other words, the objec-
tion to jurisdiction effectively blocks a potential shift in customary law
as to the definition of the crime. However, if interested states approve of
or acquiesce in the court's definitional expansion of the crime, such ap-
proval or acquiescence may signal a possible customary shift regarding
the definition of the crime in line with the definition adjudicated by the
court. Hence if the Pinochet extradition had taken place, and if the Span-
ish courts had rested their jurisdiction on the universal crime of genocide
using their exorbitant definition of the crime-which we know is exorbi-
tant because we can measure it objectively against the treaty defini-
tion-Chile would determine, either by approval or rejection of Spanish
jurisdiction based on this definition, the potential for a customary defini-
tional expansion of genocide as contrived by the Spanish courts. It
should be emphasized that even were Chile to approve of the exorbitant
definition and the resulting universal jurisdiction, Spain's jurisdiction
would still conflict with international law; one territorial or national
state's approval of or acquiescence in a definitional expansion would not
be enough to change the customary definition of the crime,124 especially
against the backdrop of a widely-ratified and longstanding treaty to the
contrary.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Essay has been to explicate a basic but over-
looked legal feature of universal jurisdiction: If national courts prosecute
on grounds of universal jurisdiction, they must use the international le-
gal definitions-as derived from customary law-of the universal
crimes they adjudicate. The Essay further has attempted to explain the
124. A basic definition of the hard-to-pin-down threshold for determining the existence of
customary law appears in the Restatement, which states that "[c]ustomary international law results
from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obliga-
tion." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987) (emphasis added). Whatever view one takes of how much practice achieves the threshold
level of generality and consistency necessary to form customary law, one improper assertion of
universal jurisdiction accepted as legitimate by an interested state and in the face of a treaty to the
contrary would not meet that test.
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best way of going about determining what those definitions are, by look-
ing to the provisions of widely-ratified and longstanding international
treaties. An important implication of this conclusion addresses concerns
that universal jurisdiction hazards unbridled abuse for purely political
and sensationalist ends. As I hope to have shown, the international law
in this area does not permit such abuse; rather, it prescribes legal limits
of universal jurisdiction. These limits are enforced not by those states
exercising universal jurisdiction, but principally by those states whose
nationals are the subject of foreign universal jurisdiction proceedings.
Indeed, should states come to recognize this Essay's thesis, the near fu-
ture may very well see precisely this type of legal argument being made
where universal jurisdiction claims are in dispute.
VI. APPENDIX
Basic Treaty Provisions (with Commentary)
Defining Universal Crimes
PIRACY
The Convention on the High Seas, more commonly known as the Ge-
neva Convention on the Law of the Sea, sets forth the substance of the
crime of piracy for purposes of customary law. It was first signed in
April of 1958, entered into force in 1962, and has 62 states party.125 The
Convention states in its preamble that it was designed to "codify the
rules of international law relating to the high seas" and, in so doing,
"adopted the following provisions as generally declaratory of established
principles of international law,"'126 thus explicitly embodying the custom
in this area. The Convention provides that "[a]ll states shall cooperate to
the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or
in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,"1 27 and defines
"piracy" as "any of the following acts":
Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
125. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Sec-
retary-General, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXXI/
treaty2.asp (last visited June 14, 2006).
126. Convention on the High Seas pmbl., done Apr. 29, 1958, 1 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
[hereinafter Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea].
127. Id. at art. 14.
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On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against per-
sons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or air-
craft;
Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 of this article.12 8
Articles 100 and 101 of the more recent Montego Bay Convention on
the Law of the Sea, which entered into force in 1994 and has 149 states
party, 129 contain a prohibition on and definition of piracy in language
virtually identical to that in the Geneva Convention. 130
SLAVERY
The Geneva and Montego Bay Conventions on the Law of Sea also
recognize the criminal nature of slavery as a matter of customary law in
their provisions. The conventions provide (again, in essentially identical
language) that "[e]very State shall adopt effective measures to prevent
and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag, and
to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that purpose. Any slave taking
refuge on board any ship, whatever its flag, shall ipsofacto be free.''
128. Id. at art. 15.
129. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Sec-
retary-General, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterxxl/
treaty6.asp (last visited June 14, 2006).
130. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 516 U.N.T.S.
205, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea]. Article 100
states: "All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State." And Article 101 states:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for pri-
vate ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and di-
rected:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a)
or (b).
131. Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 127, at art. 13; see also Montego
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There are, however, conventions more specific to the crime that expli-
cate its customary definition. The Slavery Convention, signed at Geneva
on September 26, 1926, which has 80 states party 132 and which was
amended by a 1957 Protocol (that changes obligations under the Con-
vention in respect of the League of Nations to obligations of the United
Nations) that currently has 59 states party' 33 expresses in its preamble
the universal scope of its "intention of securing the complete suppres-
sion of slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land and sea,"
"to find a means of giving practical effect throughout the world to such
intentions," and "to conclude to that end more detailed arrangements.',
34
The Convention sets forth the following definitions:
Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exer-
cised.
The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisi-
tion or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery;
all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to sell-
ing or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of
a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in
general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.'35
These definitions are further mirrored and reinforced in the Supple-
mentary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, which entered into force in
1957136 and currently has 119 states party. 137
Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 131, at art. 99.
132. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Sec-
retary-General, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/
treaty3.asp (last visited June 14, 2006).
133. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Sec-
retary-General, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/
treatyl.asp (last visited June 14, 2006).
134. Slavery Convention, pmbl., Sept. 25 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, amended by
Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, 212
U.N.T.S. 17.
135. Id. at art. I.
136. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, arts. 1, 7, done Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
Article 7 in the "Definitions" Section IV of the Convention provides:
(a) "Slavery" means, as defined in the Slavery Convention of 1926, the status or condi-
tion of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right or ownership
are exercised, and "slave" means a person in such condition or status;
(b) "Slave trade" means and includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or dis-
posal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition
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GENOCIDE
The plain language of Article I of the 1948 Genocide Convention,
which has 138 states party,' 38 firmly entrenches genocide as a crime un-
der international law. It provides: "The Contracting Parties confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a
crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to
punish."'' 39 Article II defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 140
Article III makes illegal "Genocide; Conspiracy to commit genocide;
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; Attempt to commit
genocide; [and] Complicity in genocide."' 4'  This definition has endured
unaltered up through present-day conventional law. 142 As noted, 143 judi-
cial gloss has construed certain acts, such as rape, to fall within the defi-
nition of acts that can qualify as genocidal.
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale of ex-
change of a person acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged; and, in general,
every act of trade or transport in slaves by whatever means of conveyance.
137. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Sec-
retary-General, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVlll/
treaty4.asp (last visited June 14, 2006).
138. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Sec-
retary-General, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treaty
l.asp (last visited June 14, 2006).
139. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art I, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at art. II.
141. Id. at art. Ill.
142. The ICTY, ICTR and ICC all use the Genocide Convention's definition to define the
crime. See ICC Statute, supra note 74, art. 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 74, art. 2; ICTY Statute,
supra note 74, art. 4.
143. See supra, discussion accompanying notes 73-75.
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There is no unifying international instrument concerning crimes
against humanity, though these crimes have been the subject of water-
shed instruments of international criminal law. The Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg defined crimes against human-
ity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other in-
humane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 44
The Principles of the Charter state that crimes against humanity are
crimes irrespective of their legality under domestic law, signifying that
they are offenses under international law. 145 Since Nuremberg, a number
of international instruments have catalogued crimes against humanity.
The most precise and comprehensive of these are the statutes governing
international criminal courts. As noted, 146 the statutes of the ICTY and
ICTR explicitly include, inter alia, imprisonment, torture, and rape
among "other inhumane acts."'147 The ICC statute particularizes further
the list of crimes against humanity, 14 8 refines the "other inhumane acts"
catch-all with the express requirement that the acts must be "of a similar
character [to other crimes against humanity] intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health," and
provides detailed definitions of the terms and crimes listed as crimes
against humanity. 149
144. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
145. This reading is confirmed by the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Char-
ter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, princ. II, July 29, 1950, U.N.
GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
146. See supra discussion accompanying note 74.
147. ICTR Statute, supra note 74, art. 3; ICTY Statute, supra note 74, art. 5.
148. ICC Statute, supra note 74, art. 7. Subsection 1 provides the general definition of crimes
against humanity and adds to the explicit list: (in connection with rape) sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity; enforced disappearance of persons; and the crime of apartheid.
149. Id. Subsections 2 and 3 define the crimes and terms in Subsection 1. The latter two provi-
sions read:
For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involv-
ing the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph I against any civilian popu-
lation, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such at-
tack;
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WAR CRIMES
War crimes are the subject of more international conventions than any
other universal crime. The so-called "Law of the Hague" and "Law of
Geneva," referring respectively to the overlapping Hague and Geneva
Conventions governing the rules of war, largely account for international
law in this area,1 50 though the statutes and jurisprudence of international
(b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the
deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of
part of a population;
(c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of traf-
ficking in persons, in particular women and children;
(d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement of the
persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are
lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law;
(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physi-
cal or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except
that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to, lawful sanctions;
(f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carry-
ing out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way
be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;
(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity;
(h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred
to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic
oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;
(i) "Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention or abduction of per-
sons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political or-
ganization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term "gender" refers to the two
sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does not indi-
cate any meaning different from the above.
150. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS
AND THEIR PENAL PROVISIONS 285-86 (1997). Among the relevant Hague Conventions here are
the: Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
1803, and its Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; Convention Re-
specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, and its Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The four Geneva Conventions are: Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
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criminal tribunals also contribute instrumentally to the customary scope
and definition of war crimes. I have argued elsewhere against the blan-
ket exercise of universal jurisdiction over war crimes.' 5 ' Two independ-
ently persuasive reasons combine to caution strongly against the use of
war crimes generally for universal jurisdiction purposes. First, aspects of
the law of war are inherently vulnerable to manipulation. For instance,
many of the laws of target selection and proportionality boil down to
standards invariably encompassing marginal cases,' 52 the legality of
which in practice will depend largely on the interpretive discretion of the
prosecuting court, thus making war crimes allegations and prosecutions
vulnerable to massage by politically motivated states for purely sensa-
tionalist or propagandist, rather than legal, incentives. This high degree
of exposure to political abuse combines to trouble the use of universal
jurisdiction over war crimes with the reality that "any armed conflict, no
matter how carefully planned and executed and no matter what the justi-
fication, will involve instances that can be viewed as war crimes."'153
That is, unlike other universal crimes--e.g., genocide, slavery-these
marginal instances that potentially could be viewed as criminal may be,
as a practical reality of war, inevitable. Thus, universal jurisdiction over
war crimes is both susceptible to political manipulation and available
virtually every time an armed conflict takes place, no matter the legality
or the desirability of a given military' action or, for that matter, its un-
precedented adherence to humanitarian law. There is accordingly a real
danger that "[t]he usefulness of universal jurisdiction under the right cir-
cumstances would be undermined by stretching the category to include
wrongful or doubtful circumstances.'' 154 Furthermore, universal adjudi-
cative jurisdiction is legally flimsy here since no positive instrument
of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (1950) [hereinafter Ge-
neva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War], and the two Additional
Protocols are: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3
[hereinafter Protocol I]; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
151. See Colangelo, supra note 3, at 587-94.
152. See id. at 588-92.
153. Id. at 593.
154. Id. at 592.
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concerning the law of armed conflict provides affirmatively in its juris-
dictional provisions for the conventional equivalent of universal jurisdic-
tion. 155
The most legally sound and practically responsible exercise of univer-
sal jurisdiction over war crimes limits the doctrine to "grave breaches"
of the Geneva Conventions. A colorable legal argument can be made
that "the general obligations to enforce, which include the specific obli-
gations to prevent and repress 'grave breaches' of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I, allow states to expand their jurisdiction to
include the theory of universality." 156 To the extent that the Conventions
condition the existence of a "grave breach" on a willful violation of the
relevant provision(s), 157 this high mens rea prerequisite creates a needed
threshold for prosecutions that protects against baseless assertions of
universal jurisdiction over marginal cases rooted only in political or sen-
sationalist motives. The relevant articles outlining "grave breaches" in
the Conventions are: Article 50 common in the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field and the 1949 Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea' 58 which have 195 states party respec-
tively; 159 Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
155. Thus leaving to the state wishing to subject an alleged war criminal to its adjudicative
process absent territorial or national links a frail reliance on the permissive nature ofjurisdictional
assertions generally under international law (since there is conversely nothing in positive law pro-
hibiting such assertions over war crimes). See Bassiouni, supra note 42, at 51-52.
156. Id. at 52.
157. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 15 1, art. 50; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra note
151, art. 51; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 15 1,
art. 130; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.
147; Protocol I, supra note 151, arts. 11, 85.
158. They provide in pertinent part:
Grave breaches.. shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against
persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not jus-
tified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, supra note 15 1, art. 50; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 151, art.
51.
159. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 493-94
[hereinafter TREATIES IN FORCE].
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Treatment of Prisoners of War,160 which has 195 states party;' 6 1 Article
147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War,' 62 which has 195 states party, 163 and Arti-
cles 11 and 85 of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts,' 64 which has 182 states party.165
160. It provides in pertinent part:
Grave breaches... shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against
persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile
Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial pre-
scribed in this Convention.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 151, art. 130.
161. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 160.
162. It provides in pertinent part:
Grave breaches.. shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against
persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhu-
man treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or se-
rious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement
of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile
Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial pre-
scribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and ap-
propriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 151,
art. 147.
163. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 160.
164. Protocol I provides the most detailed index of grave breaches. Article 11(4), which re-
lates to the physical and mental protection of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, provides that
[a]ny wilful act or omission which seriously endangers the physical or mental health of a
person who is in the power of a Party other than the one on which he depends and which
either violates any of the prohibitions [listed] in paragraphs I and 2 [of the Article] or
fails to comply with the requirements of paragraph 3 shall be a grave breach of this Pro-
tocol.
The "grave breach" provision of Protocol I is, however, Article 85, which provides in full:
Article 85. Repression of breaches of this Protocol
1. The provisions of the Conventions relating to the repression of breaches and grave
breaches, supplemented by this Section, shall apply to the repression of breaches and
grave breaches of this Protocol.
2. Acts described as grave breaches in the Conventions are grave breaches of this Proto-
col if committed against persons in the power of an adverse Party protected by Articles
44, 45 and 73 of this Protocol, or against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked of the ad-
verse Party who are protected by this Protocol, or against those medical or religious per-
sonnel, medical units or medical transports which are under the control of the adverse
Party and are protected by this Protocol.
3. In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the following acts shall be re-
garded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed wilfully, in violation of the
relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or
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TORTURE
The relevant international instrument proscribing the universal crime
of torture is the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,' 66 which currently has
141 states party. 167 The preamble evidences the universal scope of the
health:
(a) Making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;
(b) Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian ob-
jects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civil-
ians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii);
(c) Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the
knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage
to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii);
(d) Making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;
(e) Making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat;
(f) The perfidious use, in violation of Article 37, of the distinctive emblem of the red
cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other protective signs recognized by the
Conventions or this Protocol.
4. In addition to the grave breaches defined in the preceding paragraphs and in the Con-
ventions, the following shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when com-
mitted wilfully and in violation of the Conventions or the Protocol:
(a) The transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the
occupied territory within or outside this territory, in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth
Convention;
(b) Unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;
(c) Practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages
upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination;
(d) Making the clearly recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of worship
which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples and to which special protec-
tion has been given by special arrangement, for example, within the framework of a
competent international organization, the object of attack, causing as a result extensive
destruction thereof, where there is no evidence of the violation by the adverse Party of
Article 53, sub-paragraph (b), and when such historic monuments, works of art and
places of worship are not located in the immediate proximity of military objectives:
(e) Depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to in paragraph 2 of this
Article of the rights of fair and regular trial.
5. Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol,
grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes.
Protocol I, supra note 151, art 85.
165. States Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Trea-
ties as of 14-Jun-2006, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party-main-treaties/$File/IHLand_
otherrelatedTreaties.pdf.
166. Torture Convention, supra note 21.
167. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Sec-
retary-General, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterlV/treaty
14.asp (last visited June 14, 2006).
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prohibition, which grounds itself in the "recognition of the equal and in-
alienable rights of all members of the human family" and "universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms"
necessitating "the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world." 168 To be sure,
the chairman-rapporteur of the Working Group established by the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights who drew up the Convention, and an au-
thor of the initial drafts of the Convention, make clear that the Conven-
tion's principal aim was to strengthen enforcement of the existing inter-
national ban on torture, not to outlaw it because "the Convention is
based upon the recognition that [torture is] already outlawed under in-
ternational law."' 69 Article I of the Convention provides:
For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is in-
tentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions. 70
ACTS OF TERRORISM
As previously discussed, 17 ' while "terrorism" broadly-labeled is not a
crime of universal jurisdiction due to its definitional infirmity, there are
certain clearly-defined international crimes most people would consider
to be acts of terrorism that are subject to universal jurisdiction. Two ex-
amples that come immediately to mind are the hijacking and bombing of
aircrafts. The main international conventions dealing with these crimes
are, respectively, the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, the Hague Hijacking Convention, 172 which currently
168. Torture Convention, supra note 21, preamble.
169. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988).
170. Torture Convention, supra note 21, at art. 1.
17 1. See supra, discussion accompanying notes 43-47.
172. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
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has 185 states party, 173 and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (the
Montreal Convention),174 which currently has 186 states party.' 75 Both
instruments provide for the conventional equivalent of universal adjudi-
cative jurisdiction in their jurisdictional provisions. 176 As to the defini-
tions of the crimes, under Article 1 of the Hague Hijacking Convention:
1. Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of in-
timidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or at-
tempts to perform any such act, or
is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform
any such act commits an offence (hereinafter referred to as "the
offence"). 177
And under Article 1 of the Montreal Convention:
1. Any person commits an offense if he unlawfully and inten-
tionally:
performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft
in flight if that is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an air-
craft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to en-
danger its safety in flight; or
places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to de-
stroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it inca-
pable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endan-
U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Hijacking Convention].
173. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 160, at 373-74.
174. Montreal Convention, supra note 46.
175. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 160, at 374-75.
176. Article 4 of the Hague Hijacking Convention provides that, in addition to states with ter-
ritorial or national links to the offense:
Each Contracting State shall.. take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the alleged offender is present in its terri-
tory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in
paragraph 1 of this Article.
Hague Hijacking Convention, supra note 173, art. 4. Similarly, Article 5 of the Montreal Conven-
tion provides that:
Each Contracting State shall.. take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences [defined].. .in the case where the alleged offender is pre-
sent in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in paragraph I of this Article.
177. Hague Hijacking Convention, supra note 173, art. 1.
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ger its safety in flight; or
destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with
their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of
the aircraft in flight; or
communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safety of the aircraft in flight.
2. Any person also commits an offence if he:
attempts to commit any of the offences mentioned in paragraph I
of this Article; or
is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit
any such offense.178
178. Montreal Convention, supra note 21, art. 1.
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